We analyze Hotelling's duopoly model on the plane. There are two players (firms) located in different points inside a circle and the customers are distributed with some density in it. The solution of two game-theoretic problems is derived. The first problem is to find the equilibrium prices for the homogeneous goods, and the second problem is to find the equilibrium allocation of the players inside the circle. The equilibrium in location game is constructed for uniform and non-uniform case.
Introduction
Imagine a city in the form of the circle S (see Fig. 1 ) with population distributed in it with some density function f (x, y). We consider a non-zero-sum location game with two players (Firms) I and II which are located in some different points P 1 and P 2 inside the circle. The objective of the players is to determine the optimal prices for the same goods in dependence of their position on the plane. Let the radius of the circle be equal to 1. Suppose that the firms I and II declare the prices for the goods as p 1 and p 2 . We will use here the Hotelling's model to determine which firm will be more attractive for a customer who is located in the point P ∈ S. The customer compares the cost functions F (p i , ρ(P, P i )) with arguments p i (price) and ρ(P, P i ) (distance from his location point P to the firm point P i ), i = 1, 2, and prefers the firm with minimal value. So, all customers in S are divided for two parts S 1 and S 2 respectively their preferences to firms I and II. So, the gains of the firms I and II can be determined by functions
where µ(S) = S f (x, y)dxdy is the probability measure of the set S. Mainly, we analyze here a problem with F = p + ρ 2 . Our objective is to find the equilibrium prices in this game and the equilibrium allocation of the players on the plane.
The location problem, firstly, installed by Hotelling (1927) as a problem of Nash equilibrium of competitive facilities on a linear market, afterwards was considered in linear variant in the articles of D 'Aspremont et al.(1979) , Kats (1987) , Bester et al. (1996) , Zhang et al. (1998 ), Sakaguchi (2001 . Dresner (1982) and Hakimi (1983) consider the location problem as a Stackelberg equilibrium problem on the plane and a network, respectively.
In this paper we analyse Nash equilibrium location problem on the plane. At the begining (Section 2) we find Nash equilibrium in the pricing game model with a population uniformly distributed in the circle. Notice, that in the uniform case (1) will take the following form
Then, in Section 3 a non-uniform case is analyzed and the equilibrium prices are derived. In Section 4 we consider the problem of the equilibrium points for allocation of players on the plane. Different versions of non-uniform distribution are compared in Section 5. Final remarks and a possibility of another cost functions are presented in the Conclusion.
Solution for Uniform Distribution
Turn over the circle S that points P 1 and P 2 become have the same ordinate y (see Fig. 2 ). Denote the the coordinates of P 1 and P 2 on the axis O x as x 1 and x 2 respectively. Without loss of generality suppose that According to Hotelling's scheme the regions S 1 and S 2 are distiguished by the line
which is a parallel for the axis O y with coordinate
So, according to (1) the payoffs of the players in this game are
with x satisfied (2). We find the equilibrium prices from the equation
Find the derivative of (3) in p 1 .
Having it equal to zero we obtain
Analogously, from ∂H2 ∂p2 = 0 it follows that
Finally, using (2), (5), (6) the equilibrium prices can be represented in the form
Remark 2.1. If x 1 + x 2 = 0 then x = 0 by (2), and, consequently, p 1 = p 2 = πx 1 , by (5)-(6), and H 1 = H 2 = πx 1 /2 by (3)-(4). Hence, the maximal equilibrium prices are reached with x 1 = 1 and x 2 = −1 and equal to p 1 = p 2 = π. The optimal payoffs are equal to H 1 = H 2 = π/2 ≈ 1.570. So, if customers locate uniformly in the unit circle, then the two firms should locate as far as possible on a same diameter.
Some numerical values are presented in the Table 1 . 
Solution in Non-uniform Case
Suppose that customer's distribution is not uniform. Consider here the case when the density be
It corresponds to the case with customers which are concentrated closer to the center of the city. Notice, that it is sufficient to consider here only the case with x 1 + x 2 ≥ 0, otherwise, we obtain the solution changing the signs of x 1 , x 2 . Then the expected rewards (1) to the players are
where 
The conditions
Substituting these p 1 and p 2 into
we obtain
Remark 3.1. It follows from (13) that A(x) is convex, decreasing with A(0) = π/12 and A(1) = 0. The right side of (16) is negative, hence,
Let us show that the equation (16) has the unique solution. Rewrite it in the form
Derivative of the function B(x) staying at the left side of the equation (17) B (14)- (15), and Table 2 the results of numerical calculations are presented. 
Equilibrium Points for Location
From previous considerations we saw that if the points of player's location P 1 and P 2 are fixed then there are some equilibrium prices p 1 and p 2 . So, we have p 1 , p 2 as a function of x 1 , x 2 . Now, we can install the problem: are there equilibrium points x * 1 , x * 2 for the location of players. This problem often appeares when we plan some infrastructure for the socio-economical regional systems. Let us consider this model for the non-uniform case considered in Section 3.
Assume that the player II selects the point for location x 2 < 0. The objective of player I is to find the point x 1 which maximizes his reward H 1 (p 1 , p 2 ). Let us find the solution of the equation
Differentiating (14) and (17) in x 1 we obtain 1 2
and
and, consequently,
The equation (18)- (20) can be used to find the optimal response x 1 of player I. Notice, that from symmetry of the problem it follows that if the equilibrium exists then it must be among collections of the form (x 1 , x 2 = −x 1 ). In this case 
Substituting it into (18) we obtain
and, finally,
So, the optimal points for location of the players are x * 1 = π/4, x * 2 = −π/4, with equilibrium prices p 1 = p 2 = π 2 /6 and rewards
Remark 4.1. Revisiting to the uniform distribution case (Section 2), the similar calculation made in Section 4 proceeds as follows: From (3), (7) and (9), we get
, and hence
So we conclude that the expected reward attains at its maximum at x * 1 = −x * 2 = 1. And this location gives, from (3) and (7),
Another Non-uniform Case
Suppose that the customer's distribution has the density
where a > 0 is chosen such that f (r, θ) ≥ 0, ∀r and θ. The adequate choice of a will be explicitely given later. Also, equation (22) reduces to the uniform case if a = π −1 . The expected rewards to the players for the price-pair (p 1 , p 2 ) are
where x satisfies the equation (2), and
Note that
and hence
which will be used later. The condition
Substituting these prices into (2), we obtain
The right side of (28) . If x 1 + x 2 = 0, then x = 0 satisfies (28), and, from (26)- (27),
Now we repeat the procedure employed in Section 4. From (23), (26) and (28), we get
and hence, using the values of J(0), J (0) and J (0),
Therefore, the condition 
and the payoffs of the players will have the same form (3)-(4). Demanding that the prices (p 1 , p 2 ) satisfy the equilibrium conditions we obtain the formulas:
With (33) we can represent it in the form
The results of numerical calculations are presented in the Table 4 . = 0 gives us the optimal location for this case
Comparing with the uniform case considered in Section 2, where the optimal location was x * 1 = 1, we can conclude that the choice of the cost function influences strongly on the solution.
